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LAISSEZ-FAIRE THEORY IN THE EARLY
AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION
Norbert Brockman, S.M.*
The organized bar in the United States has, throughout its history, been
shaped by the currents moving the history of the country at large. Thus, when the
revolution that was Jacksonian democracy gathered strength in the 1820's, the
legal profession felt its effects. The common view of the bar was that of Alexis de
Tocqueville, who remarked: "If I were asked where I place the American Aristoc-
racy, I should reply without hesitation... that it occupies the judicial bench and
bar."' In the rising tide of Jacksonianism, this feeling could only result in a
reaction against the organized bar. It was not uncommon for editors to accuse
associations of undermining the bar, or even of being "conspiracies against the
community at large."2
Traditionally, lawyers had been "called" to the bar, the admitting agent
in the United States invariably being the court system. The Jacksonian spirit,
however, embodied a deep distrust of any special class which enjoyed public
privilege. Consequently, in the years before the Civil War the tendency was
to open bar admission to a greater number of citizens by lowering standards
for admission. In New York, applicants were required to pass "an examination
which was little more than a sham." The same journal making this accusation
alleged that the "practice of the law was converted into a trade, and placed
under the rule of caveat emptor."' This was blamed on the state Constitution
of 1846.
The same pattern was repeated across the country. A charming story
is told of Abraham Lincoln, who served for many years as bar examiner for
the State of Illinois. One candidate found himself being examined while the
future president was taking a bath. The questioning was as casual as the cir-
cumstances.4 The breakdown in bar admissions standards reached its apogee
in the Indiana constitutional provision, ratified in 1851, which read: "Every
person of good moral character, being a voter, shall be entitled to admission to
practice law in all courts of justice."5 By 1860, nominal educational requirements
existed in only nine states. Elsewhere, not even the form was maintained.
That this condition existed well into the latter part of the century is testified
to by the terse remark of the biographer of President William Howard Taft,
admitted to the Ohio bar in 1880: "Only obvious idiots or persons of demon-
strable depravity were denied a certificate of fitness for the Ohio bar."'
* A.B., Univ. of Dayton; M.A., Ph.D., Catholic Univ. of America; Member of the
faculty of Political Science, Univ. of Dayton.
1 DE TOCQUEVILLE DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA 278 (New York, Knopf 1945).
2 Bar Associations, 4 SOUTHERN LITERARY MESSENGER 581 (1838).
3 The Bar and the Courts, 25 THrE NATION 222 (1877).
4 WOLDMAN, LAWYER LINCOLN 153-54 (Boston, Houghton Miffin 1936).
5 IND. CONST., art. VII, § 21 (1851). This was repealed by referendum in 1932.
6 1 PRINGLE, THE LIFE AND TIMES OF WILLIAM HOWARD TAFT 52 (New York, Farrar and
Rinehart 1939).
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I The Bar Association Movement
It is in the context of internal decay that the bar association movement
of the 1870's and 1880's must be understood. By 1870, the general feeling of
unrest among the better-educated lawyers brought about the foundation of the
first viable bar associations, the most prominent of which was the Association
of the Bar of the City of New York. Within a few years, eight state and eight
local associations were organized. The major motivation was the reform of the
bar, although in some cases the reform notion was somewhat broader in scope.
It is generally conceded, for instance, that one of the purposes in organizing
the New York City association was opposition to the Tweed Ring.'
Promulgation of new court rules governing admission was the usual means
of raising standards in most jurisdictions, since the states' legislatures were
controlled by the poorly-educated element of lawyers, who were not anxious
to improve the low standards and requirements that had made their careers
possible.'
These new associations brought together the leaders of the bar in the
larger cities and states. Many of these men knew one another through political
activities, and the associations generally provided opportunities for increasing
social contacts as well.' Many of the more scholarly lawyers, who often devoted
much of their energies and fortunes to legal education and the formation of
modem law schools, were at the same time practitioners with wide contacts.
They served to focus interest upon legal education and gave it its position as
the preferred form of legal training.
A national occasion for the meeting of those lawyers involved in legal
education was the annual meeting of the Department of Jurisprudence of the
American Social Science Association. At the meeting held in September, 1877,
Simeon B. Baldwin, scion of the prominent Connecticut family and Professor
in the Yale Law School, delivered a paper entitled "A Graduate Course in Law
Schools."'" During the convention, Baldwin discussed the malaise of legal train-
ing with Judge Felix P. Poch6 of the Louisiana Supreme Court, and in the
course of their conversation Judge Poch6 suggested that the need existed for a
nation-wide bar association."
Baldwin was immediately taken with the idea, and he moved rapidly to
follow through on it. At the 1877 meeting were a number of leaders in the
law school movement, and doubtless the idea for a national bar association
was discussed with some of them, because several became sponsors of the
organizational meeting of the American Bar Association which came shortly
after. Baldwin stated some years later that the Department of Jurisprudence
of the A.S.S.A. passed a resolution at the 1877 meeting endorsing the formation
of a national bar association. 2
7 HURST, THE GROWTH OF AmERICAN LAW 286 (Boston, Little, Brown 1950).
8 Radin, The Achievements of the American Bar Association: A Sixty Year Record, 25
A.B.A.J. 1007, 1013 (1939).
9 This was an important purpose in the early years. See, in this regard, Hill, Bar Asso-
ciations, 23 Am. L. REv. 213 (1889).
10 9 JOURNAL OF SOCIAL SCIENCE xii (1878). The address is not printed.
11 Weart, American Bar Association, 27 N.J.L.J. 338n (1904). Weart incorrectly refers to
the judge as "Feltin Poche."
12 Baldwin, The Founding of the American Bar Association 3 A.B.A.J. 658 (1917).
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Within a few days Baldwin began to collect opinions from friends on the
question.' 3 He worked swiftly but planned carefully, and as a consequence
the program had from the start the support of some of the most prominent
members of the American bar. Baldwin himself was only thirty-seven at the
time, and although he was the prime mover behind the organization of the
American Bar Association, he associated older and better-known lawyers with
the foundation from the very start.
Encouraged by the reception he received, Baldwin brought the question
before the annual meeting of the Connecticut State Bar Association the follow-
ing January. This Association was quite willing to lend its name to the enter-
prise as long as Baldwin was willing to do the work. A committee was named,
with Baldwin as secretary, and a circular letter was sent out to prominent lawyers
throughout the country, inviting them to an organizational meeting at Sara-
toga Springs, New York, the following August. The sponsors of the letter were
fourteen well-known legal figures. 4
During the summer of 1878 Baldwin prepared for the organizational meet-
ing by writing a draft of constitutions for the association. This was later to be
accepted almost without change.' 5 The purposes of the organization were stated
in a preamble: "To advance the science of jurisprudence, promote the adminis-
tration of justice and uniformity of legislation throughout the union, uphold
the honor of the profession of the law, and encourage cordial intercourse among
the members of the American Bar."16 Baldwin's contribution did not end with
the drafting of the constitutions. He became a member of the Executive Com-
mittee of the nascent organization, where he remained for ten years. In 1890
Baldwin was elected president of the Association, and continued active, in one
form or another, until his death in 1927.7
The Motives of the Founders: Evolution of a Theory
For the most part, the founding fathers of the American Bar Association
were politically active public figures and legal educators. This latter fact is an
important one in terms of the reasons for the foundation of the Association.
These men, thoroughly schooled in the law as a learned profession, had a highly
developed professional consciousness that was quite foreign to the mentality
of the vast majority of practitioners."
13 Anthony Higgins to Simeon E. Baldwin, 16 October 1877; William Hamersley to
S.E.B., 20 February 1878. Simeon E. Baldwin Papers, Yale University Library.
14 1 REPORTS OF THE AMfERICAN BAR AsSOCIATION 4 (1878). [Hereinafter cited as REP
ABA.] See also N.Y. Times, Aug. 22, 1878, p. 2, col. 5.
15 Baldwin, op. cit. supra note 12, at 693.
16 1 REP ABA 30-32 (1878) gives the complete constitution.
17 Purely as a subject for biography, Baldwin is an interesting figure. His record of civic,
legal, and political activity is amazing. He served as president of at least seven professional or
scholarly organizations, including the American Historical Association (1905) and the Amer-
ican Political Science Association (1910). At Yale Law School, under his direction, graduate
legal education was begun in America. A Republican most of his life, he became a mugwump
in 1884. After a number of years as associate judge of Connecticut's highest court, he served
two years as chief judge. Then, at seventy, when compulsory retirement forced him off the
bench, he ran for governor and was elected as a Democrat. He served until 1915, even though
continuing his course at Yale, as he had done while on the bench. He retired from Yale Law
School in 1920, and died seven years later, at eighty-seven years of age.
18 HOFSTADTER, THE AGE OF REFORM 155-63 (New York, Knopf 1955).
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For the first years of the Association's existence, the effective management
of affairs was in the hands of this small group of men. Dean James Grafton
Rogers summed up the authority of the inner circle by saying: "They met on
the hotel porch after lunch and planned what the Association was to do. They
decided who was to be invited as orator next year, and they usually elected
the orator to be president the succeeding year."19 It might be well to show
some of the personal contacts shared among these leaders of the American bar
who met thus each year in Saratoga Springs.
Dean Rogers mentions the members of the inner circle as having been,
besides Baldwin, Luke Poland of Vermont, James Broadhead of Missouri,
Edward Phelps of Vermont, Randolph Tucker of Virginia, Henry Hitchcock
of Missouri, George Wright of Iowa, John H. B. Latrobe of Maryland, Francis
Rawle of Pennsylvania, Carleton Hunt of Louisiana, Benjamin Bristow of New
York, Thomas Semmes of Louisiana, Alexander Lawton of Georgia, and Wil-
liam Allen Butler of New York.20
Most of the members of the inner circle were prominent in public life.
Baldwin was not yet forty when the Association was begun, but within a few
years he entered onto his amazing political career. Judge Poland was a member
of his state's highest court, and later served as Minister to Austria-Hungary.
Broadhead and Hitchcock, prominent in Missouri affairs, are together credited
with having kept that state from secession in 1861. Bristow was Secretary of
the Treasury until 1876, and was well known for exposing the Whiskey Ring.
His wide following is indicated by his strength at the 1876 Republican conven-
tion, where he lost the presidential nomination only on the seventh ballot.
Poland had been one of Bristow's supporters at this convention. George Wright
had recently been in the U.S. Senate. Alexander Lawton, former Quartermaster-
General of the Confederacy, was a leading southern figure.2
At the same time the inner circle included leaders in legal education.
Baldwin's name is notable here, since he had already begun his long and influ-
ential association with the Yale Law School. A few years later Edward Phelps
was to join him on its faculty. Senator Wright had been the founder of the
law school of the University of Iowa, and Henry Hitchcock had founded the
law school of Washington University of St. Louis. Thomas Semmes was on
the Tulane University law faculty, and Carleton Hunt was dean of the Univer-
sity of Louisiana Law School during this period.
It is not difficult to see that under this early leadership the Association
should develop as a selective bar association. It would be unfair to attribute
this to snobbery; the exclusiveness of the Association in the early days stemmed
much more from the genuine concern of the elite of the bar for the state of the
profession. It was recognized that raising of standards had to be done by a
group which itself had high standards, and which excluded lawyers who did
19 ROGERS, AMERICAN BAR LEADERS iX (Chicago, A.B.A. 1932).
20 Ibid. See also, by the same author, The American Bar Association in Retrospect, in 1
LAw, A CENTURY OF PROGRESS: 1835-1935 166 (New York, New York University Press 1937).
21 Thirteen of the fourteen are noted in the DICTIONARY OF AMERICAN BIOGRAPHY, only
Congressman Tucker not being included.
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not measure up.22 The low estate of the bar in 1878 made it impossible that a
nonselective bar association could be the agent of improvement, and the A.B.A.
consistently led the fight for higher standards of legal education."
Some contemporary students of the political process have overlooked this
ethical and professional concern in the formation of the American Bar Association.
They tend to explain the foundation of the Association as a reaction against
the currents of political reform in the 1870's. By a process of implication and
inference the suggestion that the Association was not divorced from the laissez-
faire social philosophy of its day has grown into the conclusion, sometimes stated
as a hard fact, that the Association was established as a reactionary tool with
which to attack the embryonic liberalism of the day.
The American Bar Association was indeed born into the age of laissez-faire
conservatism. A later section of this article will explore the extent to which this
doctrine was espoused by the leaders of the A.B.A. The Association, however,
did not cause it; it was no more its champion than were many other social
forces that were far more potent in the post-Reconstruction period.
The contention that the American Bar Association was a powerful force
for laissez-faire politics began with the work of the late Benjamin Twiss, who
stated that the bar of the latter half of the Nineteenth Century served to trans-
late the concepts of laissez-faire economics and its attendant political theory
into forms acceptable to the courts.24 Professor Edward S. Corwin, who had
directed Twiss' dissertation and later edited it for posthumous publication,
repeated the same idea much more forcefully in his preface to the book:
Dr. Twiss shows that the development of American Constitutional
Law during the period from 1875 to 1935 was . . . the work pri-
marily of a small group of lawyers whose clients were the great
financial and business concerns - in short, of the aristocracy of the
American Bar, the founders and principal figures of the American
Bar Association.25
While this might be a supportable thesis during part of the long period
mentioned here, especially in the 1890's, the founders of the Association cer-
tainly do not fit the description. As far as A.B.A. figures are concerned, one
must wait for men of the stamp of James Coolidge Carter and Joseph Choate
to find commanding constitutional lawyers who had the power to instruct the
courts in such a dominant fashion.
The year before the publication of Twiss' work, in a series of lectures
at the Claremont Colleges, Corwin applied this theory even more specifically
to the foundation of the American Bar Association, stating flatly that "organ-
ized as it was in the wake of the decision in Munn v. Illinois ... the Associa-
tion soon became a sort of juristic sewing circle for mutual education in the
22 REED, TRAINING FOR THE PUBLIC PROFESSION OF THE LAW 215-17 (New York, Car-
negie Foundation for the Advancement of Teaching 1921).
23 SUNDERLAND, HISTORY OF THE AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION 72-75 ([New York, Survey
of the Legal Profession] 1953) briefly outlines the work of the Association in this regard during
the early period.
24 Twiss, Lawyers against Government (unpublished Ph.D. thesis, Princeton University,
1938). In 1942 this was published by Princeton University Press as Twiss, LAWYERS AND THE
CONSTITUTION. It is substantially unchanged, but the footnotes and bibliography were not
printed.
25 TwIss, LAWYERS AND THE CONSTITUTION, X (1942).
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gospel of Laissez-Faire." Twiss' research is given as authority for this state-
ment.20 The implication that the Association's founding was connected some-
how with the distaste of conservative leaders for the Granger Decisions has not
been lost on succeeding writers in this subject. Although Twiss himself used
A.B.A. sources (largely speeches at the annual meetings) to support his points,
he was careful to say that while they showed evidence of laissez-faire philosophy,
there was also evidence hat this was not the universally held position in the
Association.2" Professor Arnold Paul, writing more recently, points out" that
"from the standpoint of representativeness, however, conclusions drawn from
the segment of professional opinion analyzed by Twiss are apt to be iisleading.""8
Professor Corwin, nevertheless, was quite specific in associating the fotirida-
tion of the Association with the Granger Decision in a series of lectures at
Louisiana State University: "Its birthplace was Chicago, a fact reflecting the
animus of some of its founders toward the 'barbarous' decision in Munn v.
Illinois." 29 Corwin's error of fact concerning the place of foundation is doubt-
less due to the fact that the headquarters of the Association have been in
Chicago since 1927. Until that time, the secretaries had maintained their offices
in Baltimore. Corwin goes on, however, at the same point, to name twenty-
four prominent members of the Association as examples of his statement, but
only one of these - Edward Phelps - could be considered a founder of the
American Bar Association. Some others, such as Louis D. Brandeis, would
certainly be difficult to associate with the viewpoint expressed.
It was only a step, therefore, from Corwin's statements to the more recent
one of Professor C. Herman Pritchett. Citing Corwin's Claremont lectures as
authority, Pritchett gives an even more outright expression of the thesis in
saying that "the Association was founded in Chicago in 1878, and a principal
purpose of its organization was to fight the 'barbarous' decision of Munn v.
Illinois."' 0
Professors Alpheus T. Mason and William Beaney, in a recent casebook,
state that the A.B.A. "stood with John Stuart Mill, for individualism, agreed
with Darwin's view of the inevitability of human struggle, and accepted Her-
bert Spencers evolutionary theory of politics." That some of the leaders of the
bar, organized and otherwise, subscribed to these principles is without question;
a later section of this article will explore the degree to which this was true in
the American Bar Association. To conclude from this, however, that the'A.B.A.,
from its inception, "was embarked on a deliberate and persistent campaign
of education designed to reverse the (Supreme) Court's broad conception of
legislative power" is to ascribe to the Association an influence which it simply
26 CORWIN, CONSTITUTIONAL REVOLUTION, LTD. 85. (Claremont, Claremont Colleges
1941).
27 Twiss, LAWYERS AND THE CONSTITUTION 177 (Princeton, Princeton University Press
1942).
28 PAUL, CONSERVATIVE CRISIS AND THE RULE OF LAW 4n (Ithaca, Cornell Unio"
versity Press, 1960). Paul, studying the period 1887-1895, finds that "the general hardening of
conservative attitudes" began only in 1892. (76-81).
29 CORWIN, LIBERTY AGAINST GOVERNMENT 137-38 (Baton Rouge, Louisiana State Univer-
sity Press 1948).
30 PRITCHETT, THE AMERICAN CONSTITUTION 558 (New York, McGraw-Hill 1959).
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did not possess." Furthermore, there is no evidence that the "campaign" con-
sisted in more than a few speeches to the Association's annual meetings. The
American Bar Association, through its early years, never passed a resolution
attacking progressive legislation, never engaged in criticism of the Supreme
Court for any of its decisions, and never engaged in any legislative activity
concerned with social questions.3 2
Speaking from personal recollections, his father having been a founding
member of the Association, Dean Roscoe Pound stated emphatically to the
present author that "as to the proposition that the American Bar Association
was organized in reaction against the Granger Cases I am satisfied nothing
could be more mistaken."" Elsewhere Dean Pound emphasizes the reprofes-
sionalization of the bar almost exclusively in his analysis of the bar association
movement."4 Other historians of the American legal profession take this view
as well, notably Professor J. Willard Hurst, who remarks that "Simeon E. Bald-
win's conviction that legal education and bar admission standards must be
improved was a prime factor in the founding of the Association.""
The Association during the Saratoga Era
Saratoga Springs, New York, where the Association's annual meetings
were held regularly until 1902, was a famous resort and also a favored vacation
spot for southern lawyers. It was a natural place for a national meeting of the
type Simeon Baldwin envisioned in 1877, and its advantages continued to
attract the Association back again and again. In fact, the spirit of relaxed vaca-
tion became the real spirit of the American Bar Association during the "Sara-
toga Era," as it has been called. The A.B.A. during this time made almost
no attempt to join local and state bar associations to itself, and its activities
were few. Philip Wickser, long-time apostle of bar federation, termed this
period one of "placid self-esteem during which the theory of insulation was
supreme.""s When the Association, in 1884, debated the question of the codi-
fication of substantive law, an issue ardently supported by David Dudley Field
of New York, it decided to postpone the debate until the following year because
of its importance. The Albany Law Journal reflected the feeling of many in
the legal community when it said of the decision by the Association: "When,
in Heaven's name, was anything else of importance ever brought before it?"3 "
Although the Albany Law Journal's acid comment was somewhat unfair,
the Association's accomplishments were few. It was responsible for the drafting
and submission of the bill which eventually created the federal circuit courts,
31 MASON & BEANEY, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 383 (Englewood Cliffs, Prentice-
Hall 1954).
32 In 1888, the Association took up the question of delays in hearing cases in the federal
courts, and successfully sponsored a bill to set up the Circuit Courts of Appeal. In 1895 it
sponsored legislation on court systems for the Indian reservations. These were its only concerns
with legislation in the Nineteenth Century.
33 Roscoe Pound to the Author, 24 May 1960.
34 POUND, THE LAWYER FROM ANTIQUITY TO MODERN TIMES 254 (St. Paul, West Pub-
lishing Company, 1953).
35 HURST, op. cit. supra note 7, at 361.
36 Wickser, Representative Government in the American Bar Association, 19 A.B.A.J. 17(1933).
37 32 ALBANY L. J. 161 (1885).
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and it gave a great impetus to legal education. This second question was in-
timately tied to the overriding motive for the foundation of the Association,
the reprofessionalization of the bar. In the years up to 1900, it is the recurring
theme at the annual meetings. Several of the reports of the Committee on
Legal Education are outstanding statements on the contemporary situation.
The consistent policy of this committee and its successor, the Section on Legal
Education (1893), was the encouragement of formal legal education, either
with or without law-office training. 8
It is interesting to note that even these few conc6rns are not primarily
those of the first ten years. The Circuit Courts bill was enacted by Congress
in 1896; the Section on Legal Education, which notably increased activity in
this area, was begun in 1893. Even in regard to quite minor issues, the activi-
ties are mostly post-1890. This trend coincides with the decline of the little
inner circle which had directed the Association during the first ten years, and
coincides as well with the rise to prominence of laissez-faire philosophy in the
deliberations of the Association.
It was only natural that as more and more lawyers joined the American
Bar Association and interest in its work increased, these men would become
restive under the direction of the inner circle. They were less content to have
programs and officers given to them, and they wanted to take part in the
Association's affairs and government. After 1890, only two presidents were
chosen from among the inner circle, and only one of its members was elected
to the Executive Committee. Although the group continued as active members
until the end of the Saratoga Era, its dominance diminished. By the turn of
the century, only Baldwin, Rawle, and Hunt were still alive. It must be said
to Baldwin's credit that he saw this trend and welcomed it. He resigned from
the Executive Committee in 1888 to encourage wider participation in the lead-
ing offices of the Association.
The most striking thing about the formative first years of the Association
was its insularity. Thus, what Max Radin called "the technical insufficiencies
of the law" were the main concern of the elite of the bar during this time. The
social and economic changes of the times seemed to have little deep implication
for them, and although they were no more conservative than the majority of
American leaders, the duty of the lawyer was thought to be the protection of
his clients, a concern for the condition of the bar, and little else. Radin remarks
succinctly: "that lawyers as a class - or a definite body of men - could or
should exercise a group influence on the community, was a rather novel idea."
To some, it was more, it was an "impertinence." 9
The Rise of Laissez-Faire in the Association
Nevertheless, this attitude toward social and economic life was not mere
indifference. On the contrary, it was bolstered by an active and thorough
philosophical position generally known as laissez-faire. There is a readily ap-
38 See especially the reports at 4 REP ABA 237-301 (1881) and 14 RiP ABA 301-360
(1891).
39 Radin, The Achievements of the American Bar Association: A Sixty Year Record, 26
A.B.A.J. 135, 141 (1940).
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parent dichotomy here, but it does seem to have concerned the leaders of the
bar.
The lawyers, even the educated ones who constituted the American Bar
Association, were hardly concerned with laissez-faire as an intellectual doctrine.
Insofar as they philosophized about it, it was by way of rationalizing policy.
It was then, more an attitude and an approach to public questions. It was
not without substance, to be sure, but substance was subordinated to its prac-
tical consequences.
To the lawyer of the late-Nineteenth Century, laissez-faire implied a sort
of inherent goodness attached to private initiative as opposed to public authority.
The lawyer believed that the good of the country was served through the mas-
sive combines that were building up American industrial empires. He con-
sidered the role of government as hardly more than that of a moderator of
affairs which saw to it that the progress of industrial capital was not interfered
with or unduly retarded. Conservative thought presumed that a natural law
of social progress existed which in itself was capable of bringing the greatest hap-
piness to the greatest number. The conservative mind saw, therefore, only error
in the regulation of economic or social factors, since interference by government
would upset the natural course of social evolution. Indebted intellectually to
the Social Statics of Herbert Spencer, this element of conservative thought in-
sisted upon the freedom of social and economic forces to achieve a natural
harmony in which the best interests of all would be guaranteed.
This carried with it the corollary that in the progress of society there exists
a natural tendency toward freedom. The individual's right to freedom from
government restraint or protection was regarded as an inherent, God-given
principle. At no point did the conservative thinkers deny that individual rights
implied social obligations, but the logic of their position emphasized the con-
clusion that the interests of society were best cared for when the individual
was left free to participate in the evolutionary development of society. The
Darwinian concept of "survival of the fittest," while not often expressed so
brutally, was an essential part of the conservative rationale. It was held that
the truly great individual would assert himself despite difficulties, and if, unfor-
tunately, he belonged to a nationality or race less socially or politically developed
than others, it was not within the province of government to amend this."'
These were the dominant ideas among educated men, not only in the
law, but also in the universities and political life. If the Bench and Bar seem
to have had a disproportionate influence in the development of conservative
thought in the perspective of history, it is less that the philosophical implica-
tions of laissez-faire were searched out in the courts than that the lawyers and
judges were in a pre-eminent position to put these notions into concrete formulas,
and to make even the United States Constitution a force for conservatism. The
period from the end of the Civil War to the turn of the Century was one in
which judicial leadership asserted itself to an unprecedented degree, and a
40 SPENCER, SOCIAL STATICS, OR THE CONDITIONS ESSENTIAL TO HUMAN HAPPINESS
SPECIFIED (New York, Appleton, 1865). See especially Chapters IV and V.
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conservative bar brought questions of national policy before a "conserative
bench. The result could hardly have been surprising.4
The power and pervasiveness of the "Gospel of Wealth," as preached by
Andrew Carnegie and other disciples of Spencer, was such that even the
opponents of laissez-faire policies shared this evolutionary idea. Those who
fought the industrial giants-the Knights of Labor, the Grangers, Populists,
and Bryanists -were not opposed to the Gospel of Wealth on principle. What
they wanted was to share in its advantages.42
The American Bar Association had been formed on the belief that only
a- selective association would be capable of raising the tone of the profession.
Consequently, the membership consisted of the better-educated lawyers, and
generally the more successful. Among such a group of men, given the temper
of the times, it would have been most unusual if conservative thought had not
dominated. As Twiss has pointed out, the leaders of the bar represented the
great industrial complexes and often fought social legislation in the courts.
After 1890, these men were increasingly from among the prominent members
of the A.B.A.43
During the first years of the Association's history, laissez-faire attitudes were
largely present only as the personal predilections of the leading figures. When
Simeon Baldwin's biographer says of him that "if Baldwin can be called a liberal
at all, it is only in the nineteenth-century sense," he might have been speaking
of the clique as a whole.44 Evidence of this philosophy appears not merely
sporadically but constantly in the speeches and reports of the formative years.
Throughout the Saratoga Era, conservatism became more articulate and pro-
nounced. It did not, however, obscure the major interest of the Association
- the problem of the state of the profession. And, perhaps more significant,
it did not eventuate in political or legislative activity.
At the 1879 annual meeting, George Mercer, member of the General
Council for Georgia, delivered an address entitled "The Relationship of Law
and National Spirit." The lawyer's function in society, he insisted, is the main-
tenance of a proper national spirit. If this could be realized, asserted Mercer,
no one need fear any challenges to the existing social order. The lawyer must
understand first of all that "it is impossible to introduce and maintain good
legal institutions among a people whose spirit is debased and unprepared to
receive them." If legal institutions at a high level do exist, the lawyer must
expect that the best of them "will decline and perish if subjected to the in-
fluence of a vitiated national spirit." Finally, "the prevalence of a proper
national spirit will temper the worst institutions, and may ultimately subvert
them."
4'
41 POUND, A Hundred Years of American Law, in 1 LAW, A CENTURY OF PROGRESS:
1835-1935 18 (New York, New York University Press, 1937).
42 McCoy, American Political Philosophy after 1865, 21 THOUGHT 249 (1946) is a pro-
vocative discussion of this proposition. See also Carnegie, Wealth, 148 NORTH AMERICAN RE-
vrw 655 (1889).
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President James 0. Broadhead, in his address to the same meeting, pointed
out further consequences of the neglect of this national spirit:
Efforts at social reform, political convulsions and domestic insurrec-
tion agitate the sea of public sentiment until the tempestuous waves
threaten to sweep away, and do often sweep away, the barriers
which protect individual right.46
The call was a clear one- the bar must man the barriers, keeping efforts
toward social reform at a minimum.
Lest any of the members at the meeting failed to get the precise point,
Judge Edward Phelps put it plainly enough for all to understand in a mem-
orable speech: "We are charged with the safekeeping of the Constitution itself."
Convinced as they were that the U.S. Constitution embodied the laissez-faire
principles, the conservative thinkers never considered that their position might
be as partisan as that of the social reformers who argued the constitutionality
of social legislation. On the opinions of the great Chief Justice John Marshall,
Phelps asserted that "we can find no more trace in any line of those great
judgments, that would indicate the political sentiments or bias of the Chief
Justice, than if we were to study his opinions upon charter parties, or policies
of insurance." Who else but the lawyers should take special responsibility for
the preservation of the Constitution? "It is they who make it; it is through
them that it must take effect .... The question is, how far party differences
shall go? Where shall they set out, where shall they terminate? Shall they
invade the province of the fundamental law?" The answer to these questions,
according to Judge Phelps, must be a ringing "No!" Rhetorically he asked:
Should the lawyers of this country meet as on a common 'ground,
in respect to all questions arising upon the national constitution,
dealing with them as questions of jurisprudence and not of party,
setting their feet upon and hands against all efforts to transgress
the true limits of the constitution, or to make it at all the subject
of political discussion?
Indeed, Judge Phelps maintained, the Constitution was too sacred to be defiled
by the intrusion of political motivations in its interpretation. Following this
chimerical view, he believed, as did the majority of his listeners, that because
laissez-faire indicated the natural order of society, it was synonymous with the
principles of the Constitution. He finished with a paraphrase of the words of
God to Moses from the burning bush: "'Put off thy party shoes from off thy
feet, for the place on which thou standest is holy ground.' "" Many of the
members present were reduced to tears at this evangelistic invocation of their
ideals. 48
The following year, the mystical element in the formation of the Con-
stitution was underlined by Cortlandt Parker, who likened the Constitution
to "the planetary system, which came forth evolved through forces whose
working was never perceptible, and was shaped by Almighty hands into order
and beauty and power." 9 Four years later, Andrew Allison described to the
46 "Presidential Address," 2 REP ABA 51, 70 (1879).
47 "John Marshall," 2 REP ABA 173, 185-190 (1879).
48 Weart, op. cit. supra note 11, at 292.
49 "Alexander Hamilton and William Patterson," 3 REP ABA 149, 150 (1880).
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annual meeting the erosion of the older constitutional doctrines which, he held,
had all but nullified the protection of the ruling in the Dartmouth College Case.
"Fortunately," he argued, "there is an inner Republic, formed of the Bench
and Bar, to whose wisdom, moderation, and patriotism, the issues joined are
first submitted.""0
It is on the basis of these statements and others like them that some
authorities have accused the American Bar Association of conducting a con-
certed campaign to inculcate the spirit of laissez-faire into constitutional theory.
Although there were voices of dissent, conservatism was a growing force in the
Association. To infer from this, however, that the Association engaged in a
conscious and "persistent campaign to get the Supreme Court's attitude of
tolerance [in the Granger Cases] . . . replaced by Cooley's doctrine that in
effect property was a divine right" is a gross exaggeration of the Association's
influence as well as its unanimity. The theory that "the impact of the American
Bar Association's propaganda campaign on the changing personnel of the Court"
caused a shift in judicial position that produced the rejection of the doctrine
of the Granger Cases, as Mason and Leach insist, is not borne out by the
closest reading of the Reports.5"
The error lies in the presumption that somehow the members of the Bar
Association were the agency by which laissez-faire assumed dominance in
American constitutional thought. Yet only three Supreme Court Justices were
members of the A.B.A. in this period, and of these (Justices George Shiras,
Stanley Matthews, and Henry Brown) only one showed any interest in Asso-
ciation affairs."2 Of the prominent lawyers of the period, a number were mem-
bers of the Association, but only some of these were active; Corporation
lawyers and advocates of the stamp of James Coolidge Carter and Joseph
Choate were not active until after 1890. The original founders of the Asso-
ciation and the members of the inner circle of the early years were not attorneys
for the great financial interests. It is simply unwarranted to speak of a causal
connection between the Supreme Court's acceptance of laissez-faire doctrines
and the influence of the American Bar Association. 5
The Dominance of Laissez-Faire
By 1894 much had changed in the American Bar Association. The first
fifteen presidents included twelve of the original inner circle; their eleven suc-
cessors included but one. Beyond this, the presidents in this second group
were men of quite a different character. Many of them had made their repu-
tations as vigorous advocates. The few law-school professors among them
50 "The.Rise and Probable Decline of Private Corporations in America," 7 REP ABA, 241,
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there is no record of either attending any meetings. Matthews remained a member until 1888,
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sion much more than has previously been thought.
NOTRE DAME LAWYER
were no longer pioneers in that field, as Baldwin, Hitchcock, and Wright had
been.
The man who best epitomizes the transformation was the president for
the year 1894: Thomas McIntyre Cooley - professor, jurist, and above all
constitutional theorist. Cooley is regarded by many as the most influential writer
on the Constitution in the Nineteenth Century. His Constitutional Limitations,
first published in 1868, was kept in print for half a century, and became a
conservative bible to be quoted in the courts and cited time and again in briefs
in major constitutional cases." In the words of Benjamin Twiss, Cooley's
work, as it affected the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment,
"almost singlehanded caused the shift of emphasis from personal to property
rights. Thus he prepared the way for the broad interpretation of the Four-
teenth Amendment which so colored constitutional development in the ensuing
thirty or forty years." 5
Cooley's theories received a ready audience in the A.B.A. during these
years. In 1897 James M. Woolworth gave his presidential address on "The
Development of the Law of Contracts." Presuming an historical natural law
determining constitutional theory, he pointed out to the members of the Asso-
ciation that it was only in the late Nineteenth Century that the full property
rights guaranteed by the Constitution had been realized. Woolworth noted
that the courts had recently refused in several cases to interfere with railroad
rate-fixing. At one time, he asserted, these matters were considered unfit to
be regulated by contract because they were regarded as being concerned with
the public interest. The action of the courts in giving these up to "individual
competency and freedom" was cited as "another illustration of the natural law."5
The lawyers often felt a hostile fear in the face of legislatures dominated
by the spirit of reform and change. In 1897, Governor John W. Griggs of New
Jersey expressed this in a speech to the Association on "Lawmaking." He cited
his own record during the past state assembly session, in which he had vetoed
thirty per cent of the laws submitted for his signature. Governor Griggs blamed
excessive legislative action on perverse public opinion:
Render unto Caesar the things that are Caesar's is the divine
approval which the Christian world has come to regard the law
of the land as possessed of a divine sanction. Law, as thus con-
ceived, is not a thing to be changed with every whim of popular
opinion.57
In the election of 1896, although William McKinley had been chosen Presi-
dent of the United States, the Populist Party had elected twenty-five members
to the House of Representatives and six Senators." Even the national Congress
seemed suspect to some of the conservatives after that result. Was it any wonder,
then, that the lawyers should look to the courts, where their influence meant
something, to preserve their political and economic ideals? When, a year before
54 COOLEY, A TREATISE ON THE CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIONS WHICH REST UPON THE
LEGISLATIVE POWERS OF THE STATES OF THE AMERICAN UNION (Boston, 1st ed. 1868).
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his death, Benjamin Bristow associated himself with Joseph Choate on the
brief in the Income Tax Case, he regarded this as one of the greatest services
he had ever performed. Choate, delivering his famous "March of Communism"
speech to the Supreme Court, stated feelingly, and no doubt truthfully, "I
have felt the responsibility of this case as I have never felt one before."' 9 One
of the reasons for the success of the conservatives before the courts was their
great sense of mission. This responsibility for the Constitution "correctly con-
strued" was shared by the bench which heard them and made their case doubly
easy. Throughout the period of the rise and eventual dominance of laissez-faire
attitudes in the American Bar Association, however, criticism from within the
Association was outspoken.
Voices of Dissent
Disagreement with the prevailing notions of the conservatives arose quite
early in the American Bar Association. In 1881 Clarkson Potter, although
accepting much of the conservative rationale, was willing to admit that the
ideas of strict and liberal construction of the Constitution were matters that
changed with the times. He abhorred the attempts to institutionalize conserva-
tive ideas through constitutional construction rather than congressional action,
and implied that he thought the whole matter a political, and not a legal,
concern."0 Two years later when Robert Street opposed "judge-made law"
to the point of maintaining that the Supreme Court did not have the power
of judicial review, the debate revealed striking differences of opinion among
the members of the A.B.A. Some spoke in glowing terms of the Court, others
were sharply critical of "the fetish worship of the bench."61
Arnold Paul, in his recent study of the development of conservative thought
during this period, cites three addresses given in 1887 as examples of the
progressive point of view in the profession. Two of these were delivered before
the American Bar Association, and the third, by a member of the A.B.A. Execu-
tive Board, before the Ohio State Bar Association.62 The most striking of these
speeches was that of James K. Edsall, who, as Attorney General of Illinois, had
argued the Munn Case before the Supreme Court, and won it. Holding that
the authority to make contracts was merely an incidental power of government,
Edsall insisted that the states could not divest themselves by contract of their
power to enact legislation. He contended against the conservatives that "neither
the state nor the National Constitution should be so construed or administered
as to work the destruction of the very governments they were ordained to
establish and make perpetual."6
Charles Bonney, a member of the Association's Executive Committee,
59 Pollock v. Farmers' Loan and Trust Company, 157 U.S. 429, 553 (1895).
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(1889). The date of Baldwin's address is correct here.
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concerned himself with proposals for ameliorating labor difficulties. He called
for federal government regulation "to protect the weak against the strong,"
and proposed a system of collective bargaining, mediation, and (if these failed),
compulsory arbitration. 4
The third of these addresses, that of Simeon Baldwin, is of somewhat
greater significance in the light of his importance in the Association. He had
resigned from the Executive Committee in 1887, but in the year following
the speech cited here, he was elected President of the Association.
Baldwin recounted the growth of popular democracy. He conceded that
the "new power of property" had given the wealthy too much public considera-
tion, but he felt in addition that individual rights had never been better pro-
tected. Baldwin cited with approval such government activities as regulation
of hours of labor, social insurance, and safety inspections."' Both Baldwin
and Bonney very probably would have subscribed to Edsall's propositions.
Besides these three examples cited as notable by Professor Paul, there were,
of course, others. In 1885 Richard Venable spoke to the annual meeting, and
stirred little debate when he averred that "states' rights" were largely a matter
of interests. Pointing out a tendency toward centralization in government, he
commented, "I see no occasion for making ourselves unhappy over this state
of things, more than I do for mourning over evolution."6 As early as 1880
Benjamin Bristow had approved the establishment of state rate regulations
for railroads in a speech to the Association.
Despite these expressions of dissent from the laissez-faire notions of the
period, it is clear that the members of the Association much preferred Judge
Phelps' view of society to Attorney General Edsall's. Yet, they were not willing
to go so far as to use the Association as a spokesman for their ideas on ques-
tions of public policy. Regarded by its members primarily as a professional
group, the A.B.A. could not bring itself to a commitment on political ques-
tions. When, for example, in 1881, the Secretary suggested forming a Com-
mittee on Constitutional Law, the debate on the proposal covered a hundred
pages of the annual report. The general feeling was that such a committee
did not have a place in the Association. Henry Hitchcock of Missouri warned
that "there is a possibility of opening the door for action on our part, which
must necessarily be ineffectual, and will probably render us liable to the charge
of usurping an authority which we do not possess."68 Thomas Semmes merely
observed fearfully that "it might lead us off into a discussion of the constitu-
tion."'" After being ordered held over until the following year, the proposition
was never taken up again.
If, as we have noted above, the arguments of the laissez-faire conservatives
became more strident and even dominant after 1894, the voices of dissent
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became all the more outspoken. The issues joined seem to be much more spe-
cific and less theoretical than in the earlier period.
Two of the great conservative victories of 1895 were the Income Tax Case,
cited above, and the Debs Case7' both of which helped show the temper of
the A.BA. moderates. Although Joseph Choate and Benjamin Bristow were
active before the Supreme Court against the income tax, Judge Simeon Bald-
win, then sitting on the Connecticut Supreme Court, publicly supported the
tax shortly before its challenge in the federal courts.7
The Debs Case was slightly different. His attorney before the Supreme
Court was Stephen S. Gregory, a prominent member of the American Bar
Association. Gregory was later to be president of the Association and first
editor of the American Bar Association Journal. At the 1894 annual meeting,
the conduct of the Debs Case was sharply criticized in an address by Charles
C. Allen. Allen attacked the use of injunction as a sort of broadside executive
proclamation, issued against "ten thousand strikers and all the world besides."
He argued that imprisonment following upon the contempt order was nothing
but denial of trial by jury, and a dangerous precedent against civil liberties.
It took thirty-five pages to report the debate on Allen's paper, and only one
of the thirteen participants can be said to have supported him. Two others
joined in limited criticism of the use of the injunction, one of these being Wood-
row Wilson, who felt that the injunctions were impolitic and would have been
unnecessary except for the attitude of Governor John Altgeld 2
In 1897, speaking at the same annual meeting as Governor Griggs, Eugene
Wambaugh gave a long list of government activities that had developed in
recent years. Wambaugh, far from disapproving, suggested that "it seems
clear that the growth of governmental functions has been wise and necessary."
The trend he noted was not an abandonment of the "natural liberty" which
was the concept of the Founding Fathers of the Constitution, Wambaugh
asserted, but merely "a change in relative emphasis." Finally, he pointed out:
For centuries two intents have guided the law, whether statutory
or judge-made: the intent to guard individual liberty and the
intent to secure the public welfare. There is no reason to believe
that either of these two deep-seated intents will be uprooted. There
is no reason to believe that the time will ever come when an enu-
meration of the functions constituting the actual scope of govern-
ment will cease to furnish a fair answer to the apprehensions of
the pessimist and to the demands of the revolutionist.7 3
While this hardly qualifies as a repudiation of laissez-faire, it nonetheless shows
some rather surprising departures from the prevailing interpretation of it. The
common good of society and the good of the individual are regarded as co-equal
intents of the law to be brought into balance. What is perhaps of greater
interest is the offhand way in which Wambaugh mentions judge-made law
as something to be taken for granted. The majority of the bar of that period
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considered the concept that judges could "make" law as an attack upon basic
legal principles. To them the law was discovered as enshrined in the Con-
stitution. The judges' interpretation of the law found in the Constitution or
in the Common Law did not create anything new, it merely applied what
already existed.
By the turn of the Century, a group, of lawyers who were skeptical of the
laissez-faire doctrines of the Association's leading members decided to speak
up. In 1903 the Committee on Commercial Law entered a report on monopoly
and industrial combinations that flatly contradicted every cherished belief of
the conservative bar. Its wording was unequivocal in denunciation of the evils
that it described, and its proposed solutions could have been lifted from a So-
cialist Party platform of the period. The shock of the report was added to by
the fact that it was signed by some of the highly respected members of the
Association. Walter Logan, chairman of the Committee, was on the A.B.A.
General Council, Henry Budd was Vice-President for Pennsylvania, and John
Morris of Indiana was on that state's local council. The other members of the
Committee were Gardiner Lathrop and George Whitelock, who later served
(1909-1920) as Secretary of the Association.
Although the report of the Commercial Law Committee did not delve
into questions of economic and political theory, the implications were obvious
enough to everyone present. It began with the statement that industrial com-
binations had changed the nature of commerce. "We shall have to substitute
a jurisprudence of commercial restriction in place of a jurisprudence of com-
mercial competition."74 It was argued that regulation had already gone beyond
the speculative stage, but was not effective, and that the federal government
had to take remedial action. To prove the insufficiency of existing legislation,
the report cited the recent Northern Securities Case,75 with which some prom-
inent members of the Association had been involved.
The courts may order a distribution of securities held by the
Northern Securities Company as much as they will, and the
securities will be distributed in accordance with the decree of the
court, but within twenty-four hours after their distribution they
will find their way back into a mammoth safe with a mammoth
maw in a certain building corner of Wall and Broad Streets, New
York.
Fundamentally, the Committee thought that it was defending the spirit of
competition and asserting the rights of the individual. It condemned monopoly
as socialistic, but went on to say that the laws of supply and demand were no
longer able to limit the growth of contemporary industrial combinations.
If the analysis was unacceptable to most of the members of the A.B.A.,
the proposed solution must have been even more objectionable. "If there must
be an industrial despot, it seems clear that it is better that it should be the state
itself than the state's creature." And, putting it more bluntly, "the only possible
competitor for a billion dollar trust is a hundred billion dollar state."7 6
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The Committee suggested three possible solutions, all of which were more
likely to anger the conservative lawyers than to offer a practical answer to the
problems. The first was to tax the monopolies to death with a confiscatory
tax that would end profits. The second, for instances in which competition
did not exist, was to require the controlling monopoly to offer its services or
products at a fifty per cent discount in prices. Finally, the Committee advo-
cated that the government enter industry as a producer in order to restore the
balance of competition."'
The Committee's report marked the end of an era in the American Bar
Association. The 1903 report was itself dealt with rather summarily. After a
sharp debate, the Committee was instructed to report to the 1904 annual meet-
ing with practical solutions to the problems they had presented. In the debate
itself, three members of the Association were most outspoken in criticism of the
views expressed in the report. Charles Manderson entered an "emphatic, ear-
nest, and indignant protest against this attempt to make of the American Bar
Association a political hustings." W. U. Hensel moved that the Committee be
discharged of any further discussion of the question of monopoly, and Frederic
Judson, later a president of the American Political Science Association, had
caused the Committee to be instructed to return with recommendations in legis-
lative form. With annual appointment of all committee members by the
President of the Association, it was an easy matter to end the conflict by appoint-
ing these three men to the Committee on Commercial Law to replace Budd,
Lathrop, and Morris. In 1904, to no one's surprise, the Committee reported
that no practical action was possible, since only the states could effectively deal
with the question of monopoly."
From this time on the conservative ideology was massively challenged time
and again in the American Bar Association. While the first twenty-five years of
the Association's history coincides with the acceptance of laissez-faire as a con-
stitutional doctrine by the Supreme Court, neither the lawyers who argued this
position so effectively nor the justices who accepted their rationale needed the
A.B.A. to accomplish the transformation. The A.B.A. contributed only two
things: a meeting ground for the members of the bar and a great number of
speeches extolling individualism, personal liberty, and the human struggle.
Yet, the theoretical role of the American Bar Association cannot be over-
looked. By bringing together some of the most prominent lawyers of the time,
the Association made it possible for these men to share and disseminate their
views. As the Reports of the annual meetings reveal in both speeches and debate,
these views were largely the prevailing ones of laissez-faire economics and politics.
The paucity of dissent in these early years only serves to point up the prevailing
attitudes.
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